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Financial Crashes versus Liquidity Trap:
the Dilemma of Monetary Policy
Gae¨l Giraud∗
CNRS, Paris School of Economics, ESCP-Europe.†
October 24, 2011
Abstract.— This paper considers a two-period monetary double auction with in-
complete markets of securities and derivatives. Players may share heterogenous beliefs.
Short positions in derivatives are constrained by collateral requirements. A central Bank
stands ready to lend money or engage in unconventional monetary policy such as quan-
titative easing. In sharp contrast with the usual picture of equilibrium properties, I show
that only three scenarios are compatible with the Nash equilibrium condition: 1) either
the economy enters a liquidity trap in the first period ; 2) or the money injected by
the Central Bank fuels a financial inflation driven by “rational exuberance”, whose burst
leads to a global crash in the next period, 3) else a significant inflation of commodity
prices accompanies the functioning of markets. In particular, neither Friedman’s golden
rule, nor the Taylor rule turn out to be compatible with the third scenario: Both in-
evitably lead to a liquidity trap. An example shows that quantitative easing does not
provide, in general, any escape from the monetary dilemma.
Keywords: Central Bank, Gains to trade, Liquidity trap, Collateral, Default,
Crash, Taylor rule, Deflation, Bubble, Rational exuberance, Heterogenous belief.
JEL Classification Numbers : D50, E40, E44, E50, E52, E58, G38, H50.
1 introduction
The Great Moderation lulled macroeconomists and policymakers alike in the belief
that we knew how to conduct macroeconomic policy. The current crisis, started
in 2007, forces us to question the assessment. In this paper, I provide a general
equilibrium monetary set-up where some elements of the pre-crisis consensus can be
∗gael.giraud@parisschoolofeconomics.fr
†I wish to thank Herakles Polemarchakis, Dimitrios Tsomocos and Alexandros Vardoulakis
for fruitful discussions, as well as participants of the Paris-1 seminar on “Banking and financial
regulation”.
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2reviewed, in order to identify what tenets of the pre-crisis framework still hold, and
to take a tentative first pass at the contours of a diagnosis of the current crisis.
For simplicity, let us consider a two-period economy with finitely many states
of Nature in the second period, finitely many types of households, a Central Bank
and no private banking sector. There are financial markets where investors can raise
money and trade derivatives in order to hedge themselves against risk. Investors may
share heterogenous beliefs about the uncertain states of Nature.1 Short positions in
financial assets must be secured by durable collaterals. Loans are non-recourse and
there is no utility penalty for defaulting. Whenever the face value of the security
is higher than the value of the collateral, the seller of the security can choose to
default. In this case, however, I assume that, instead of receiving the face value of
the security, the security buyer seizes the collateral plus part of the cash hoard by the
seller. It is only when the face value of the collateral together with the cash holding
of the seller are still lower than the face value of the security that a default is actually
recorded. To the best of my knowledge, all the previous literature devoted to default
dealt with cashless economies, and therefore assumed that, absent of utility penalty,
a seller can default without further consequences.2
The monetary dilemma
The main argument driving the result can be informally stated as follows: The
need to improve the efficiency of trades calls for an increase on the quantity of money
injected in the economy by the Central Bank. The impact of such an increase of
money essentially depends upon the agents’ expectations. If investors trust that
there won’t be enough money in the next period (relatively to the current one),
then the economy enters a global liquidity trap: the short-term interest rate shrinks
to zero while real cash balances hold by households increase with no effect on the
real economy. This is, roughly speaking, the deflationary scenario.
The alternative goes as follows: If, on the contrary, they anticipate that the Cen-
tral Bank will pump in enough money in the second period, agents go on trading in
commodities and assets. The impact of this increase of monetary liquidity, however,
is ambiguous. If the leverage ratio on financial markets is small3), then a sufficiently
large additional quantity of money will significantly raise commodity prices.4 This
is the inflationary scenario. By contrast, if the leverage ratio is high enough, the
additional quantity of money injected may fuel inflation on assets and collaterals,
eventually resulting in a financial crash. This is the crash scenario.
1However, they are assumed to coordinate on a Nash equilibrium, hence, to have perfect fore-
casts about future equilibrium prices and interest rates.
2See, e.g., Zame (1993), Kubler & Schmedders (2001), Geanakoplos & Zame (2002), Fostel
and Geanakoplos (2008), Araujo, Kubler & Schommer (2009), to name but a few. Barrett (2000)
considers collateral requirements in an economy where investors may have incorrect forecasts about
future prices (which is not allowed here).
3Equivalently, if margin requirements are high.
4In Dubey & Geanakoplos (2003a), it is shown that adding a small (relatively to the money
already available) amount of cash in the economy may reduce the equilibrium level of prices, while
a large monetary increment has the standard inflationary impact. I shall not consider this issue in
the present paper, and will focus on large monetary increments.
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Let us briefly explain why a crash may occur at equilibrium when most of the
liquidity injected by the Central bank migrates towards financial markets. Recall
that investors have heterogenous beliefs and that the prices of assets and collaterals
are given by the marginal utility of marginal buyers. When the most optimistic
agents are wealthy, they are most likely to be the marginal buyers, so that the price
of securities and collaterals will be higher. Conversely, when the most optimistic
are poor, the marginal purchaser of securities and collaterals is more likely to be
someone less optimistic, so that prices on security and collateral markets will be
lower. The injection of further quantity of money by the Central Bank reduces the
cost of money, hence leverages purchasing power, and thus drives up the security and
collateral prices. When the state of nature is revealed (in the second period), bad
news may be announced, and margin purchasers may end up poorer than they would
otherwise have been. Indeed, the inflation on the security market leaves them with a
larger debt and a larger fraction of their wealth in securities and collaterals. Because
the most optimistic are poorer, the most pessimistic are more likely to become the
marginal buyers of assets in the second period. The price of collaterals may then be
driven down by the (low) marginal utility of the pessimists with respect to collaterals.
There is a shift of ownership of collaterals, from optimists to pessimists, with its
attendant shift of prices which provokes a margin crash.5
Rational exuberance
The higher was inflation on financial markets, the deeper will be the crash in
the bad state of the second period. What makes this phenomenon compatible with
our standard rational expectations framework is the assumption that investors share
heterogenous beliefs. The 2007-2009 crisis highlighted the role of belief heterogeneity
and how financial markets allow investors with different beliefs to leverage up and
speculate. Several investment and commercial banks invested heavily in mortgage-
backed securities, which subsequently suffered large declines in value. At the same
time, some hedge funds took advantage from the securities by short-selling them.
One reason for why there has been little attention paid to belief heterogeneity is
Friedman’s (1953) celebrated market selection hypothesis: On the long-run, there
should be little differences in beliefs because agents with wrong beliefs should be
driven out of the market by those who share correct beliefs.6 Following Cao (2010),
I show, on the contrary, that collateral requirements prevent the market forces from
driving out investors with wrong beliefs. As a consequence, belief heterogeneity sur-
vives at equilibrium and can fuel what is called, in this paper, “rational exuberance”
: some investors, being convinced that an asset is undervalued by the market, will
keep buying it, hence further driving its market price. Combined with a high lever-
age ratio and a lax monetary policy, I show by means of an example (section 2), that
such a rational exuberance may lead to a global crash in some uncertain state of the
5For a first statement of this impact of collateral constraints on price volatility, see Geanakoplos
& Zame (2002). For further work, see Kubler & Schmedders (2001), Kiyotaki & Moore (1997),
Geanakoplos (2001).
6See also Blume & Easley (2006) ans Sandroni (2000).
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4second period. The main departure with Cao (2010) is the introduction of money
within a pure-exchange setting, while Cao (2010) considers a cashless production
economy with heterogenous beliefs.
One by-product of this analysis is that, in the absence of a liquidity trap, what
enables inflation over commodities to remain bounded despite the increase of liquid-
ity, is the fact that most of the injected liquidity migrates towards financial markets,
thus fueling some rational exuberance phenomenon. The example of section 2 below
exhibits an economy where this happens for a high enough leverage ratio. This pro-
vides a theoretical narrative for the Great Moderation of inflation experienced by
Western countries for the last two decades that contrasts sharply with the conven-
tional wisdom. Furthermore, this example shows that a constant level of domestic
prices is compatible with an increase of the quantity of money injected by the Bank,
together with a huge inflation both on the financial markets and the market for col-
laterals. This happens, e.g., under the condition that the leverage ratio increases at
the same speed as the quantity of money injected in period 0. The reason why col-
laterals are not immune against inflation is that they play a dual role: they are used
both for the intrinsic value and as collaterals. The larger is the financial rational
exuberance, the more attractive are collaterals.
Before entering into the details of the argument, let us immediately mention
which remedy can be thought of for this unfortunate dilemma which sheds some
light about current debates on most Central Banks’ non-conventional policies. We
do not offer any magic alternate solution. However, our model points in the following
direction. In order to avoid the threat of the liquidity trap, the Bank should convince
economic actors that it will not contract its monetary policy in the future. Long-
term interest rates emerge as a good instrument for this purpose (see the discussion
at the end of section 2). However, quantitative easing in the sense of outright
asset purchasing can turn out to be ineffective in order to fight against the liquidity
trap (see subsection 2.4 infra). A non-conventional policy designed to affect the
yield curve at longer-than-usual horizons therefore seems unavoidable. On the other
hand, in order to get rid of financial rational exuberance, regulatory authorities
should reduce the leverage power of financial derivatives. What will be the upshot
of such a policy mix ? Since the reduction of leverage on financial markets will
make them less attractive, the quantity theory of money implies that it will but
induce domestic inflation on consumption commodities. Therefore, a purposedly
fostered inflation eventually emerges as a pis-aller in order to avoid both deflation
and financial crashes.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section exhibits an example where
all the conclusions of this paper are present. Section 3 develops the general model.
In section 4, I provide some general properties of monetary equilibria such as the
survival of traders with wrong beliefs, an endogenously determined quantity theory
of money, and the non-arbitrage relations within the yield curve. Section 5 is de-
voted to proving the alternative faced by monetary authorities : either they refrain
from injecting money in the economy, at the cost of leaving an inefficient monetary
equilibrium take place; or, they pump in a virtually infinite quantity of money but
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then, in order to escape from a liquidity trap, they must convince the economic
actors that they will still inject a lot of money in the future. If they succeed in this
non-conventional task, then they face two alternative risks: either a huge domestic
inflation (when the leverage ratio on financial markets is low) or a financial ratio-
nal exuberance (when the leverage ratio is high) whose burst may induce a global
collapse of the economy in at least one second-period state of nature. A concluding
section discusses the results of the paper in light of the 2007-09 crisis. The proof
of the existence theorem is relegated to the Appendix. There, the double auction
underlying our model is made explicit.
2 An example
The next example can be seen as a monetary version of example 8 in Geanakoplos
& Zame (2002). It exhibits a situation where the three scenarios alluded to in the
Introduction can occur. In particular, a global crash occurs with positive probability
provided the leverage ratio is sufficiently large on financial markets.
2.1 The monetary economy
Consider an exchange economy with two dates, 0, 1, two states g (good) and b (bad)
in the second period, two goods, F (food) and S (stock), and two agents 1 (the
wealthy pessimist) and 2 (the poor optimist). Each type of investor is represented
by a continuum of clones having identical characteristics. Thus, each agent takes
the macrovariables (prices and interest rates) as given.7
Only the stock can serve as collateral. Expected utility functions are:
u1
(
F0, S0; (Fg, Sg), (Fb, Sb)
)
:= F0 +
1
2
(Fg + 7.33Sg) +
1
2
(Fb + 2Sb),
u2(F0, S0; (Fg, Sg), (Fb, Sb)
)
:= F0 + .9(Fg + 7.33Sg) + .1(Fb + 6Sb).
Obviously, agents have heterogenous beliefs. Endowments are:
e1 =
(
(40, 4); (40, 0), (40, 0)
)
;m1 = (2; 0, 5.49).
e2 =
(
(24, 0); (7, 0), (6.41, 0)
)
;m2 = (2; 3.39, 1.22).
The quantity of outside money owned by h in state s, free and clear of debt, is
mhs ≥ 0. Agent 1 has no monetary endowment in state g. A Central Bank stands
ready to lend or borrow money by buying or selling IOUs from the agents. For
simplicity, only two kinds of IOUs are considered throughout this paper. A short-
term IOU of state s is traded at the beginning of that state and promises C 1 at its
end. The long-term IOU is traded at the beginning of state 0 and promises C 1 just
before commodities trade in every future state s ∈ S in period 1.
In period 0, the Central Bank injects M0 on the short-term loan market and M0
on the long-run one. In the second-period state s, it injects Ms on the short-tern
market. When the Bank borrows money by selling IOUs, it temporarily reduces the
7Throughout the paper, I focus on type-symmetric equilibria.
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6stock of money. But when the IOU comes due, it returns the borrowed money, and
in addition creates more outside money to pay the interest.8 One may suppose the
Bank has quantity targets and pre-commits to the size of its borrowing or lending,
letting interest rates be determined endogenously at equilibrium. This would be
faithful to the quantitative “pillar” of the ECB, inspired by Friedman’s celebrated
“Golden rule”. Alternatively, one may as well suppose that the Bank has interest
rate targets, and precommits to supplying whatever money or IOUs are demanded
at those rates. This would reflect the ECB’s second pillar, as well as most contem-
poraneous Central Banks’ mandate, in the line of Taylor’s rule. I shall consider both
policies in the sequel.
Consumption goods can be stored. For simplicity, there is no capital deprecia-
tion.9 Food is perishable and stock is durable: When consumed in period 0, food
cannot be inventoried into period 1 while stock can be consumed in period 0, stored
into period 1 and consumed in this last period.
I assume that there is no default on the short-term loans market.10
Suppose that there is an asset, A, which promises delivery of β times the price
of one unit of food in each state, collateralized by a unit of stock. In a barter
framework (where money is only implicit), the actual delivery of one unit of asset
in state s ∈ S would be:11
Asβ := min{βpFs ; pSs }.
Here, I assume instead that, whenever agent h defaults, not only is her collateral
forfeit but also (part of) her cash. It is only when the value of the collateral plus
the cash available to the borrower do not suffice to fulfill her promise that default
is registered.
In period 0, first agents trade IOUs with the Central Bank in order to borrow
and lend money both on the short- and long-run monetary markets. Second, they
trade commodities and assets. Third, they repay back their debt on the short-term
loan market. In state s = g, b, at time 1, first agents deposit or borrow money on
the state-s-short-term loan market. Second, the long-term IOUs from the previous
period deliver. Third, agents trade commodities. Fourth, they repay back their
debt on the short-term loan market and the financial asset delivers. Fifth, the
agents consume. In the fourth step, if necessary, the cash obtained through the
sale of commodities in the previous step of the same period can be used in order to
finance the assets’ return.
8This may be viewed as one of the origins of outside money in this model, inherited from some
unmodelled past.
9It would be only a notational matter —here and in the sequel of the paper— to allow for
capital depreciation and to let this depreciation depend upon the second-period state of nature.
10This is in conformity with what we currently observe. On the Repo market, for instance, where
there is day-to-day lending, there is virtually no default and even in crisis periods, like 2007-2010
or 1998 or 1994, the rate of default remained hardly significant.
11See, e.g., Geanakoplos & Zame (2002).
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2.2 Monetary equilibria
The utility maximization programme of agent h can be conveniently written as:
max
θh, xh≥0
uh(xh)
s.t. p0 · (xh0 − eh0) + qβθh +
r0
1 + r0
µh0 + µ˜
h
0 ≤ mh0 (1)
ps · (xhs − ehs ) +
rs
1 + rs
µhs ≤ mhs + Asβθh + (1 + r0)µ˜h0 + ∆(1) ∀s = g, b (2)
where θh ∈ R is h’s portfolio, qβ is the asset’s price, and Asβ stands for the actual
monetary delivery of one unit of asset in state s ∈ S, given by:
Asβ := min
{
βpFs ; p
S
s − ps · (xhs − ehs )−
rs
1 + rs
µhs +m
h
s + (1 + r0)µ˜
h
0 + ∆(1)
}
.
Notice that (2) does not imply that a borrower is forced to sell commodities in
state s whenever the value of the collateral, pSs , falls below the value of the promise,
βpFs . It simply says that, if the latter happens and if the borrower has sold some
commodities in state s, then the cash she received against these sales will be forfeited
in order to pay her debt. Of course, at equilibrium, no agent will sell any commodity
of which she derives a positive utility in a state where she defaults.
In (1), the bid-ask spread12 is given by
σ0 := r0/(1 + r0). (3)
A monetary equilibrium is defined as a collection
(
ps, rs, (θ
h, xhs )h
)
s∈S∗ of prices,
interest rates, portfolios and commodity allocations such that each (θh, (xhs )s) solves
h’s utility maximization problem subject to (1) and (2), and all markets clear:∑
h θ
h = 0, (asset market clearing)∑
h(x
h
s − ehs ) ≤ 0, ∀s ∈ S, (commodity market clearing)∑
h(µ
h
s + µ˜
h
0
) ≤ (1 + rs)Ms ∀s, b, (money market clearing at t = 1)∑
h(µ
h
0 − µ˜h0 − µ˜h0) ≤ (1 + r0)M0. (money market clearing in state 0).
The parameter β is exogenous. In practice, margin requirements (which, in the
US, are set by the Federal Reserve) are usually expressed in terms of a cash down
12Obviously, instead of imposing a cash-in-advance constraint —which is sometimes viewed as
being an artificial way to introduce money—, we could as well start with a bid-ask spread, σs, for
each state s, and link it with the Bank’s policy through (3). Cf. Duffie (1990) for an approach in
terms of bid-ask spread. In the present model, the two viewpoints are entirely equivalent provided
the spread can be linked with the nominal interest rate via some equation akin to (3) (and not,
say, with the volume of trades).
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8payment as a fraction of the sale price. The margin requirement on the asset Aβ is
then
(1+r0)p0S−qβ
(1+r0)p0S
. We shall also see that β drives the leverage ratio in the financial
market.
Some useful remarks before embarking in the analysis of this example:
1) In either the interest or quantity target policies, rs ≥ 0 ∀s ∈ {0, b, g}, and
r0 ≥ r0. Indeed, if rs < 0 in state s, the households could infinitely arbitrage
the Central Bank. If r0 < r0, then we must be in the quantity target model with
M0 > 0. But then, nobody would borrow on the short-term loan market, which
would therefore not clear.
2) When rs > 0 ∀s, then agents spend all the money at hand on purchases:
Indeed, they can deposit money they do not intend to spend (or else borrow less),
receiving the money back with interest, before they face the next buying opportu-
nity.13
3) As a consequence, by summing over h the (binding) cash-in-advance con-
straints in every state, we get a quantity theory of money:14
p0 ·
∑
h
(xh0 − ehs )+ + qβ
∑
h
θh+ ≤ 1
1 + r0
M0 +
1
1 + r0
M0 +
∑
h
mh0 . (4)
The difference between the right- and the left-hand sides of (4) is precisely the
amount of cash inventoried by households from time 0 to time 1. In (4), the implicit
velocity of money can be lower than 1, depending upon the saving behavior of agents
on the long-run deposit market. When there is no inventoried cash, (4) is satisfied
as an equality (and money velocity = 1).
4) There is no worthless cash at end: ∆(2) = 0. Otherwise, agent h could borrow
(a little) more on rs, use the additional cash to buy some commodity, and would
still have enough money in order to pay back her debt.
5) If r0 > r0, for any monetary equilibrium, there is another equilibrium leav-
ing prices, interest rates and consumptions untouched, but where no agent deposits
on short-loans, and no one deposits and borrows simultaneously on the long-loan
market.15 From now on, I shall always consider such an equivalent monetary equi-
librium.
6) If r0 > r0, any monetary equilibrium admits an equivalent one where each
inventorying agent deposits exactly mh0 and borrows a positive amount of money on
the short-loan market, i.e., µh0 > 0.
7) If agent h borrows some money on the long-loan market (or, else, inventories
money from period 0 into period 1), then the first-order condition on the long-loan
market requires that
13This is Lemma 2 in Dubey & Geanakoplos (2006).
14x+ := max{x, 0}.
15This is Lemma 4 in Dubey & Geanakoplos (2006a); the argument is not repeated here.
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∇h0x
p0x
= (1 + r0)E
h
[∇hsx
psx
]
,
provided she buys commodity x in every state s ∈ S∗ —where Eh[·] is the expecta-
tion operator over period 1-uncertain states (computed according to h’s subjective
beliefs) and ∇hsx stands for the partial derivative of uh with respect to state-s com-
modity x = Fs, Ss.
8) The optimist will always find it advantageous to buy stock entirely on margin
(because the cost of buying the asset in order to purchase the stock will never exceed
the cost of the stock itself at time 1). Hence, the number of units of security sold
by agent 2 is equal to the number of units of stocks she buys.
9) The relative price of the stock with respect to food in the good state will
always be pgS/pgF = 10/(1 + rg). Indeed, suppose that agent h buys some shares
and sells some food in state g. Then, denoting ∇˜h (resp. ∇h) the left-hand (resp.
right-hand) derivative of uh(·), one must have:
∇˜hS
pgS
≥ (1 + rg)∇
h
F
pgF
,
otherwise h would do better by reducing (by a little) both her purchase of Stock and
her sale of Food. But since there are only two households, the reverse inequality
must hold for h’s partner.
10) The relative price of the stock in the bad state will be at least pbS/pbF ≥
2/(1 + rb).
11) The pessimist (i.e., the lender or, equivalently, the security-buyer ) is risk-
neutral and indifferent about the timing of food consumption, so that the price qβ
of the asset Aβ will be exactly the pessimist’s expectation of its delivery. On the
other hand, the relative value of collateral (stock) with respect to food in the good
state being always 10/(1 + rg), the optimist (i.e., the borrower or asset-seller) will
never default in the good state as long as rg ≤ 9. Thus, whenever rg ≤ 9,
qβ =
{
βpbF if β ≤ pbSpbF
p0F
2
(β + pbS
pbF
) if β > pbS
pbF
.
12) The pessimist will not buy any stock in the bad state if pbS > 2pbF .
13) If the optimist does not inventory any money from period 0 into period 1,
then, relative to p0F , her implicit marginal utility of stock at date 0 is at least (1+r0)
times her expectation of the stock price at date 1. Hence, her marginal utility of
stock is at least 9.2p0F (1 + r0). If she does inventory money (or deposit cash on the
long-run loan market), then, it is at least 9.2p0F (1 + r0).
14) If the pessimist does not inventory money, her implicit marginal utility of
stock is (1 + r0) times her expectation of the stock price at time 1. Hence, it is at
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most 8p0F (1 + r0). Similarly, if she does transfer money from period 0 into period
1, then, it is at most 8p0F (1 + r0).
Now, we shall see that, whenever the leverage ratio, β, two main scenarios
emerge: either all the households do believe, at equilibrium, that the Central Bank
will inject a lot of money in period 2 (so that prices tomorrow will be high relatively
to today’s prices, and tomorrow’s interest rate relatively low), in which case a rather
“normal” functioning of markets is to be expected.16 Else, there is at least one type
of households which does not trust the Central Bank when it claims that it will
lower the short-term interest rate in every second period-state. Then, the economy
must fall in a liquidity trap whenever M0 exceeds a certain threshold.
If, on the contrary, β is large enough, then the unique escape road from the
previous alternative obtains whenever the money injected by the Central Bank into
the economy at time 0 fuels a bubble on the asset market, whose burst in the bad
state induces a global collapse of the whole economy in that very state.
2.3 The monetary dilemma
Suppose, to begin with, that β = 1, and that the Central Bank targets r0 = 9%,
r0 = 20%, and rb = 10%. The unique equilibrium is:
p =
(
1, 8; 1, 7.33; 1, 6
)
, M0 ∼ 44, M0 ∼ 0.82, and Mb = 67.1,
x1 =
(
64, 0.61; 40, 0; 46.41, 0
)
,
x2 =
(
0, 3.39; 7, 0; 0, 4
)
.
The asset price is qβ = β = 1 and there is no default in period 1. At date 0,
the optimist sells all her food and borrows to buy stock on the margin. But she
cannot afford to buy all the stock; the pessimist keeps the remaining stock. Suppose
that the optimist does not borrow money on the long-loan market. Her non-linear
budget identity becomes:
8θ2 − 1
1 + r0
(θ2 + 24) = 2.
Thus, the number of shares bought by the optimist in period 0 is θ2 = 26+2r0
7+8r0
∼ 3.39.
In the bad state, the optimist spends βθ2pbF = θ
2 to repay her risky loan on
the asset market, gets θ2 shares of stock that had been held as collateral, spends
pbS(4−θ2) to purchase the remaining 4−θ2 shares of stock, and sells part of her initial
endowment in food in order to finance her purchases. But her budget constraint is:
βθ2 + 6(4− θ2)− 1
1 + rb
x2bF = 1.22
which yields x2bF ∼ 6.41 = e2bF . Thus, having sold her entire endowment in food,
the optimist has no additional income. Moreover, it is rational for her not to bor-
16As we focus on rational expectations equilibria, then what people expect to occur must happen,
so that there will indeed be a high inflation in every second-period state.
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row money on the long-run loan market, because she would incur an additional
transaction cost that she cannot afford.
At the date 0 price vector of (1, 8), the pessimist is exactly indifferent between
stock and food if she borrows money on the long-loan market. Indeed, her marginal
utility for stock is 7.33 in the good state, and the stock will sell for 6 in the bad state,
an event to which she assigns probability .5. According to remark 7 in the previous
subsection, given r0 = 1.2, this makes the discounted relative price, 8/(1 + r0), of
stock in period 0, equal to its expected value, 1/2× 7.33 + 1/2 × 6. The pessimist
faces the following budget constraint in period 0:
θ2 + 24− 1
1 + r0
8θ2 = 2 +
1
1 + r0
µ10,
whence, she borrows µ1
0
/(1 + r0) ∼ 0.82 on the long-loan market. Her budget
constraint in the bad state is therefore binding:
βθ2 + e2bF −
6
1 + rb
(4− θ2)− µ10 ∼ 5.49 = m1b
Now, let us allow β to vary. For β large enough, the optimist must default
entirely in the bad state whenever she buys a fixed quantity, θ2 > 0, of shares in
period 0. Indeed, the total quantity of money available in the whole economy in the
bad state being bounded, there is a threshold, β, above which the promise, θ2βp0F ,
will exceed this upper-bound.
If the optimist defaults in the bad state, she will deliver her whole portfolio, θ2,
instead. Does she have an incentive to sell some food ? For β large enough, the
answer is no since the money she will acquire by selling her initial endowment in
food will be used to repay her financial debt. Thus, the optimist should rather keep
her endowment, forcing the pessimist to experience an even larger loss.
Is such a scenario compatible with the equilibrium condition ? Let us show the
answer to be yes by computing a concrete example:
Take β > 2, p =
(
p0F , p0S, qβ, pgF , pgS, pbF = 1, pbS = 2
)
, r0 = 9%, r0 = 0%, rb =
10%,M0 ∼ 44.4,M0 = 0 and Mb = 67.1.
x1 =
(
64, 0; 40, 0; 40, 4
)
x2 =
(
0, 4; 7, 0; 6.41, 0
)
.
In period 0, the budget constraint of the optimist is
4p0S − 1
1 + r0
(24p0F + 4qβ) = 2. (5)
The budget constraint of the pessimist is
4qβ + 24p0F − 4p0S
1 + r0
= 2, (6)
and the quantity theory of money yields:
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24p0F + 4qβ + 4p0S = 4 +M0,
provided that the long-term market remains inactive. Of course, qβ =
p0F
2
(β + 2)
and r0 =
4
M0
.
A simple computation yields:
p0S =
2(1 + r0)
4r0
. (7)
p0F =
2(1 + r0)
r0(28 + 2β)
. (8)
p0S
p0F
= 7 +
β
2
. (9)
Recall that an investor who borrows D and invests A = K +D in an asset faces
a leverage ratio ` := D/K. In our set-up, the leverage ratio is given by
` =
qβ
(1 + r0)p0S − qβ =
β + 2
12 + r0(14 + β)
.
For a fixed β, the impact of increasing the quantity of money, M0, is transparent:
as M0 grows to infinity, r0 shrinks to 0, ` → (β + 2)/12, and both p0F , p0S and
qβ → +∞. However, for this to be compatible with the equilibrium conditions, the
quantity of money injected in period 1 must increase as well, at least in the good
state. Indeed, suppose that M0 → +∞ but Mg remains fixed. This means that
prices in the good state will remain constant, say, equal to pg = (1, 10). But then,
for M0 high enough, the sale of a quantity, ε > 0, of food in period 0 will enable each
agent to save enough money into period 1 to be able to buy the whole aggregate
endowment of commodities in the good state. This contradicts the equilibrium
condition. Thus, either Mg increases proportionately to M0, so that prices in the
good state also increase to infinity, or the economy falls into a liquidity trap in period
0. In the latter case, there is a threshold, M0, such that, for every M0 ≥ M0, the
short-term interest rate hits its floor, r0 = 0, and the additional money, M0 −M0,
is hoard by the agents at time 0, but remains unused (and flows back to the Central
Bank at the end of period 0 at no cost).
Next, for a fixed M0 (or, equivalently, a fixed r0), if β → +∞, then the price of
the asset, qβ → 1/2r0, ` → 1/r0, and p0S remains constant while p0F → 0+. Thus,
increasing the leverage ratio while keeping the quantity of circulating money constant
induces a deflation on the domestic sector. This is the phenomenon of migration of
liquidity towards the financial market, due to its increasing attractiveness. At the
limit, all the (constant quantity of) money is captured by the financial market. Now,
the injection of further quantity of money, M0, by the Central Bank reduces the cost,
r0, of money, hence leverages purchasing power, increases the leverage ratio, `, and
drives up the security and collateral prices.
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In which sense can the price, qβ, be interpreted as a bubble ? Since the two
agents have heterogenous beliefs, the very definition of a bubble becomes ambiguous.
According to the pessimist’s viewpoint, the asset price remains correct whatever
being the parameters β and r0. According to the optimist, the asset’s subjective
value is p0F (0.9β + 0.2), so that the asset is viewed as being undervalued at time 0.
The gap between the optimist’s assessment and the market value being p0f (0.4β −
0.3), it will increase up to 0.4/r0 as β grows to infinity, making the asset all the
more attractive. This phenomenon cannot be interpreted as irrational exuberance,
as both investors have rational expectations, but is clearly due to the heterogeneity
of beliefs. Let us call this “rational exuberance”. We shall see in section 4 below,
that investors having heterogenous beliefs cannot be driven out of the market, so
that “rational exuberance” is something we must live with. It is worth noticing
that, in this example, an increase of M0 induces an increase of the maximal rational
exuberance phenomenon (measured by 0.4/r0).
Finally, if, say, β = 1/r0, then: qβ and p0S still explode, but p0F = 1. This
suggests that, whenever the leverage ratio increases at a speed similar to that of the
quantity of circulating money, then, this additional money fuels rational exuberance
on the financial market (qβ grows to infinity), but leaves domestic prices untouched
(the price of food in period 0 is constant), while only the price of the collateral
explodes (as did the housing market prices between 2001 and 2006). This means that
the deflationary effect due to the migration of liquidity towards financial markets
can be compensated by a lax monetary policy. As for the leverage ratio,
` =
β2 + 2β
13β + 14
,
it is increasing in β = M0/4.
2.4 Quantitative easing
In order to escape from the crux highlighted by the previous example (inflation/liquidity
trap/crash), the Central Bank may engage in quantitative easing (as the Banks of
England and Japan, and the Federal Reserve did after 2009).17 Recast in our set-
up, such an unconventional policy consists in: either targeting the long-term interest
rate, r0, or lending extra money by buying the asset Aβ in period 0.
Let us begin with the first interpretation of quantitative easing. Manipulating
r0 clearly has an effect in our model, as soon as the long-term markets are active
at equilibrium. This means that the usual explanation for the restriction of conven-
tional policies to the short end of the yield curve —namely, that the determination
of longer-term interest rates can be left to market mechanisms through no-arbitrage
arguments— does not hold water in our setting: equilibrium conditions do not en-
able, in general, to deduce r0 from r0, (rs)s. Thus, there is room for a policy that
17Cf. Meier (2009).
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affects the yield curve at longer-than-usual horizons. No-arbitrage, however, does
impose the following relationship within the yield curve:18
(1 + r0) ≥ (1 + r0) min
s∈S
(1 + rs).
So that an increase of M0 must imply, in general, an increase of Ms in at least one
state.19 Thus, this first version of quantitative easing may succeed in circumventing
the liquidity trap but at the cost of forcing the Central Bank to commit to a high
inflation in at least one future state. Consequently, playing with longer-than-usual
interest rates amounts to shifting to our scenario 1, where inflation prevails in one
state or another.
Let us turn to the second interpretation of quantitative easing. To keep the
analysis simple, suppose that the Central Bank no more offers money on the long-
term market but rather offers to buy the asset Aβ against fresh money.
Clearly, when β > 2, this would have no effect on the equilibrium: the optimist
already borrows to the pessimist the needed amount of money in order to purchase
the 4 units of stock available in period 0. Hence, the optimist holds already the
maximal amount of collateral and there is no additional collateral to secure any
additional loan.
When β ≤ 2, the picture is more interesting. Absent of such a quantitative
easing policy, the optimist cannot borrow enough from the sole pessimist to buy all
the stock at time 0, so that the price p0S is the pessimist’s expectation of the date
1 price of stock, i.e.,
p0S =
1
2
(10 + pbS).
The quantity theory of money at time 0 is:
24p0F + θ
2βpbF + p0Sθ
2 = 4 +M0.
If the monetary policy in period 1 is kept fixed, pbF and pbS are fixed. Hence, p0S
remains constant as well, so that, when M0 → +∞, p0F must increase until the
liquidity trap is reached.
Suppose, therefore, that the Central Bank buys Aβ in place of the pessimist (who
saves her money for a better use). If the quantity of fresh money thus injected is
large enough, the optimist will now be able to buy all 4 shares of stock on margin
at date 0. The budget identity of the optimist in period 0 is:
4p0S − 1
1 + r0
(24p0F + 4bF ) = m
2
0,
while the pessimist’s budget constraint now is:
24p0F − 1
1 + r0
4p0S = m
1
0.
18See Proposition (4.2) infra.
19In the previous example, this would mean in the bad state, as the good one is irrelevant.
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Solving these two equations yields:
p0F =
(1 + r0)
2
24r0(2 + r0)
[ 4pbF
(1 + r0)2
+
m20
1 + r0
−m10
]
. (10)
Thus, quantitative easing (in its second version) does have a real effect on the
economy. Its weakness, of course, is that such a non-conventional policy is limited
by the quantity of collateral already available in the economy. The Central Bank
might therefore wish to supplement it with a more conventional policy consisting
in reducing r0 at the same time. Equation (10) shows that p0F will then explode
to infinity again. For a fixed monetary policy at time 1, this is incompatible with
the equilibrium condition, unless a liquidity trap is hit at some finite level, M0. As
a conclusion, the second understanding of quantitative easing does not succeed, in
general, in escaping from the liquidity trap.20
3 The general model
The preceding example shows that the three scenarios described in the introduction
—inflation, deflation or crash— can be encountered. It raises the question as to
whether there are other alternatives and how general the monetary dilemma is. I
therefore move to the general case of a two-period monetary econ omy with capital
markets and collateral constraints. Still I try to keep the model tractable so as to
be able to exhibit the three stylized regimes that emerged in the preceding section.
3.1 The physical economy
The set of states of nature is S∗ := {0, 1, ..., S}. State 0 occurs in period 0, then Na-
ture moves and selects one of the states in S := {1, ..., S}, which occurs in period 1.
There are L ≥ 1 commodities —all of them are storable. Therefore, the commodity
space is RS∗×L+ , where the pair s` denotes commodity ` in state s.
The set of consumers is H := {1, ..., H}. Each household h is endowed with
eh ∈ RS∗×L+ , and has a utility function: uh : RS∗×L+ → R. There is little loss of
generality in assuming that, in each state, no agent has the null endowment and that
every marketed good is actually present in the economy, i.e., ehs := (e
h
s1, ..., e
h
sL) >
0 ∀i ∈ H, s ∈ S∗, and ∑h∈H ehs >> 0 ∀s ∈ S∗. Each uh(·) is assumed to be
continuous, quasi-concave and verifies the local non-satiation property: for each
xh ∈ RS∗ × L+ and each ε > 0, there exists some yh in the open ball, B(xh, ε), of
radius ε and centered at xh, such that uh(yh) > uh(xh).
20See McMahon & Polemarchakis (2011) for another work on quantitative easing within a GEI
model.
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3.2 Money
Money is fiat but is the sole medium of exchange. Hence, all purchases are out
of cash (this is the so-called Clower cash-in-advance constraint, Clower (1965)).21
Money enters the economy in two ways. Each agent h has endowments of money
free and clear of debt, mhs ≥ 0, in state s ∈ S∗, with
∑
h∈H m
h
0 > 0. Following
Woodford (2003) and Dubey & Geanakoplos (2003a,b), this is called outside money.
22
The Central Bank that stands ready to make short loans totaling Ms > 0 euros
for one period in each state s ∈ S∗ and also to make the long loans totaling M0 > 0
for two period starting at date 0. Money is perfectly durable. If the interest rate
on loan n ∈ N := {0, 0, 1, ..., S} is rn, then anyone can borrow µn/(1 + rn) euros by
promising to repay µn euros at the time the loan comes due.
The macrovariables are: η := (r, ρ, p, pi), where:23
r ∈ RN+ := interest rates on bank loans, n ∈ N .
p ∈ RS∗×L+ := commodity prices.
pi := (pi1, ..., piK) ∈ RK := the price of derivatives (to be defined infra).
Sometimes, I write η = (η(0), (ηs)s), breaking η into its state components.
3.3 Collateralized assets
All asset deliveries are supposed to be non-negative, and must be made in money.
When the asset promise includes commodities, Ask = (a
1
sk, ..., a
L
sk), the seller is asked
to deliver the money equivalent to ps · ajsL — where ps ∈ RL+ is the spot commod-
ity price in state s. Derivatives have payoffs that depend upon the fundamental
macrovariables (see supra). For example, a call option on firm j, with strike λj,
pays off (Vsj −λj)+ in each state s ∈ S (and usually, the strike is a function of some
macrovariables). Another example is an inflation-indexed promise, which delivers
ps · Λs in state s ∈ S, where Λs ∈ RL+ is a fixed basket of goods. More generally,
derivative k ∈ K := {1, ..., K} promises payoffs Ask(η0, ηs) euros in each state s ∈ S,
where Ask(·, ·) is a continuous function of η0 and ηs. For simplicity, we keep each
firm out of the derivative asset markets and the capital markets of other firms. Only
household h can buy or sell each derivative k at price pik, and possibly the Central
Bank whenever it engages into non-conventional monetary policies. Because there
are no a priori endowments of derivatives, such sales are “short sales”. Notice that
they are not a priori bounded.24
21As already mentioned above, this way to introduce money can be made equivalent, to a certain
extent, with alternative modeling choices in terms of bid-ask spreads.
22This endowment can be interpreted as transfer payments that are independent of equilibrium
prices. Thus, in the parlance of Woodford (1994), I consider non-Ricardian monetary policies.
23Buying and selling nominal prices are identical. The bid-ask spread will be implicitly deter-
mined, at equilibrium, by the cost of borrowing money in order to purchase.
24In gei, this unboundedness destroys the existence of financial equilibria. However, the addition
of money suffices to restore existence (Dubey & Geanakoplos (2003a)).
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Agents can only sell the asset k if they hold shares of some collateral. Asset
k is therefore associated with a vector, κk ∈ RL+, of collateral requirement. If an
agent sells one unit of security k, she is required to hold κ`k units of commodity
` as collateral.25Since the same commodity can be used as collateral for different
financial assets, the agent is required to invest κ`k in ` for each k ∈ K.26 Since
there are no penalties for default, a seller of the financial asset k defaults in state
s whenever the total value of collateral falls below the promise at that state. The
cash she owns may then be forfeited in order to compensate for the default. Default
will only be registered when the borrower’s cash itself is not sufficient to pay the
debt. The actual yield of asset k in state s can no more be defined independently
of the entire portfolio, (αhk)k, of its owner, h. It is namely given by:
∑
k
Ask(η0, ηs)α
h
k := min
{∑
k
Ask(η0, η1) ,
∑
k
pLs · κk + cash available
}
, (11)
where the (endogenous) quantity of cash available at the time of asset delivery will
be defined infra.
Because of the scarcity of collaterals, collateral requirements introduce an en-
dogenous bound on short sales. When κ`k = 0 for each k, `, there is no collateral
requirement, hence short sales are not limited. Whenever the span of the return
matrix, A, is always equal to S, and absent of collateral constraints, we call this
the “complete benchmark”. By contrast, the “incomplete case” divides itself into
two subcases: a) either there are no collateral constraints but spanA < S for some
commodity prices — this is the standard GEI case ; or κsk > 0 for each k and each
s.27
3.4 Liquidity constraints
The sequence of events is as follows. In period zero, households borrow money
either from the stock of outside money put on the loan markets by households or
from the Bank. There are two loan markets: one for the short term — where the
Bank injects the stock, M0, of inside money — and one for the long-term — where
the Bank injects M0. On each market, an interest rate emerges (resp. r0 and r0)
so as to clear the market.28 Next, the capital markets meet for the trade of assets
and derivatives, followed by the commodity markets. After this, there is a move of
chance and the economy enters one of the state s ∈ S in period 1. In any state s ∈ S,
there is a fresh disposal of Bank money Ms and of outside money put for lending by
25For the sake of simplicity, I do not allow the collateral to be held by the lender or to be
warehoused (see Zame & Geanakoplos (2002)).
26This means that tranching is not allowed. For simplicity also, only commodities are eligible as
collaterals. In particular, I do not allow assets to be used as collaterals (pyramiding).
27For simplicity, we shall focus on these three polar cases. The intermediary situation — where
κsk > 0 for some pair (s, k) but not all— is left for further study.
28Alternatively, one can imagine that the Central Bank targets the interest rates and adjust the
(endogenous) quantities M0 and M0 so as to clear markets.
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those households which saved money from the previous period, at a common interest
rate rs. Money markets in state s are followed by another round of trade in spot
commodities. Then, all the deliveries take place simultaneously: households deliver
on their derivatives. Finally agents settle their debts with the Bank and with the
households having lended money.
For any fixed choice of macrovariables η, I now describe the set Σhη of feasible
choices of h ∈ H, and the outcome that accrues to h as a function of η and of her
strategy, σh ∈ Σhη .
We denote:
µhn := IOUs (or Bank bonds) sold by h (h borrows µ
h/(1 + rn) on the loan market
n)
αhk := asset k ∈ K sold by h
qhs` := commodity ` sold by h in state s ∈ S∗.
A tilda on any variable will denote the money spent on it, i.e.,
µ˜hn := money deposited (money spent on Bank bonds of type n) by h
α˜hk := money spent by h in asset k ∈ K
q˜hs`
h := bid of h on ` in state s ∈ S∗.
The choice
σh :=
(
(µhn, µ˜
h
n)n∈N , (α
h
k , α˜
h
k)k∈K , (q
h
s`, q˜
h
s`)s∈S∗,`∈L
)
≥ 0
must satisfy the following physical constraints:29
qj0` +
∑
k
κ`k
αhk
pik
≤ eh0` ∀` ∈ L, (12)
that is, the total amount of commodities sent to the clearing house + collateral held
cannot exceed the quantity of commodities) at hand.30
qjs` ≤ ehs` +
∑
k
κ`k
αhk
pik
∀s, ` ∈ S × L, (13)
that is, the total amount of commodities supplied in state s in the second period
cannot exceed the initial endowment + the collateral stored from period 0.
The choice σh must as well satisfy the following liquidity constraints:
(i) Bank deposits in period 0 ≤ money endowed with:
µ˜h0 + µ˜
h
0 ≤ mh0 (14)
29Such constraints are standard in strategic market games, cf. Giraud (2003). They have to be
understood with the following convention x/0 := 0.
30The ratio κk(α˜
h
k/pik) is the quantity of goods stored by h as collateral for her sale of (α˜
h
k/pik)
units of asset k.)
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(ii) Expenditures on assets and derivatives ≤ money left in (14) + money bor-
rowed:
∑
k
α˜hk ≤ ∆(14) +
µh0
1 + r0
+
µh
0
1 + r0
. (15)
(iii) Expenditures on commodities ≤ money left in (15) + money obtained from
sales of assets and derivatives:∑
`
q˜h0` ≤ ∆(15) +
∑
k
pikα
h
k . (16)
(iv) Money owed and repaid on loan 0 ≤ money left in (16) + money received
from commodity sales
µh0 ≤ ∆(16) +
∑
`
p0`q
h
0`. (17)
In each state s ∈ S of period 1, we must have:
(v)s Money deposited on loan s ≤ money inventoried from period 0 + fresh
endowment of outside money:
µ˜hs ≤ ∆(17) +mhs (18)
(vi)s Expenditures on commodities ≤ money left in (18)s + money borrowed on
loan s: ∑
`
q˜hs` ≤ ∆(18) +
µhs
1 + rs
. (19)
(vii)s Money delivered on derivatives (or on collaterals in case of default) ≤
money left in (19) + money obtained from commodity sales:∑
k
Ask(η0, ηs)α
h
k ≤ ∆(19) +
∑
`
ps`q
h
s`. (20)
We are now ready to define the “cash available” in the definition of the asset return,
Ask(η0, ηs) in (11) by:
cash available = ∆(19) +
∑
`
ps`q
h
s`.
With this definition, (20) is always satisfied (and, from now, will be omitted). In
case h defaults on several assets simultaneously, an arbitrary rule divides the cash
among the various assets and their owners.31
31The quantity of cash available may be rationed proportionately to the value of a promise
relatively to the whole debt of its owner.
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(viii)s Money owed and repaid on loan s and (long-term) loan 0 ≤ money left in
(20) + money obtained from asset deliveries:
µhs + µ
h
0 ≤ ∆(20) +
∑
k
Ask(η0, ηs)
α˜hk
pik
, (21)
These constraints define the convex feasible set Σhη . The consumption that accrues
to h ∈ H on account of η and σh ∈ Σhη is xh ∈ RL×S
∗
+ , with (for all s` ∈ S∗ × L):
xh0` := e
h
0` − qh0` +
q˜h0`
p0`
−
∑
k
κ`k
αhk
pik
,
and, ∀s ∈ S,
xhs` := e
h
s` − qhs` +
q˜hs`
ps`
+
∑
k
κ`k
αhk
pik
,
and yields utility uh(xh) to player h.
3.5 Monetary equilibrium
Our definition is identical to that introduced by Dubey & Geanakoplos (2003b) ex-
cept that our convention (x/0 := 0) allows for no-trade at equilibrium (in which case,
prices are zero, and money has no value). This is consistent with the well-known
resilience of autarkic Nash equilibria in strategic market games (Giraud (2003)). We
shall see, however, that such self-fulling pessimistic prophecies (where everybody is
confirmed in the opinion that nobody will trade on markets) do not occur when
there are positive gains-to-trade.
We therefore say that 〈η, (σh)h∈H〉 is a Monetary Equilibrium (me) for the econ-
omy E := 〈(uh, eh,mh)h∈H ,A, (M0,M0, (Ms)s∈S〉 if:
(i) All agents maximize:
σh ∈ arg maxσ˜h∈Σhηuh
(
xh(η, σ˜h)
) ∀h
(ii) All markets clear:
(a) Loans, n ∈ N :
1
1 + rn
∑
h
µhn ≤Mn +
∑
h
µ˜hn (22)
(b) Assets, k ∈ K
pik
∑
h∈H
αhk ≤
∑
h∈H
α˜hk . (23)
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(c) Commodities, s` ∈ S∗ × L
ps` ·
∑
h
qhs` ≤
∑
h
q˜hs`. (24)
Remark that, when cast as a Nash equilibrium of the underlying strategic market
game, this definition of a monetary equilibria rests on the implicit assumption that
players cannot condition their actions in period 1 on the actions observed from
period 0. This is consistent with the anonymity property of large markets.32 Prices
are the unique signal on which players coordinate.
Let us briefly comment on some specific aspects of the model that are responsible
for its upshot.
a) As in most strategic market games, every transaction that an agent undertakes
requires the physical transfer of money out of what he has on hand at that time. This
amounts to various liquidity constraints. The upshot is that we have a well-defined
physical process in which effect follows cause in a time sequence. By contrast, general
equilibrium analysis steers clear of liquidity constraints because all transactions are
imagined to occur simultaneously. The point of this paper is to go beyond this and
to analyze the effects of liquidity constraints when default is permitted to occur on
markets with collateralized derivatives. As we assume that each type of investor
is represented by a continuum of negligible clones, they all take prices as given,
which considerably simplifies the analysis. The existence proof, however, provides
the full-blown double auction underlying our model (see the Appendix).
b) We assume that agents may default on certain promises and not on others, and
that the only consequence of default is forfeiture of collateral and cash. For pawn
shop loans, overnight repurchase agreements, margin loans and home mortgages,
these assumptions are relatively close to reality. For other types of collateral, these
are rather strong assumptions in the sense that, usually, bankruptcy involves default
on all collaterals, penalties and a broad spectrum of consequences in addition to
forfeiture of collateral. I depart from the standard general equilibrium model with
collateral constraints by assuming that cash can also be forfeited in case of default.
To the best of my knowledge, however, all the papers devoted to bankruptcy and
collateral constraints within a general equilibrium framework, consider an idealized,
cashless economy, and assume either that only the collateral is forfeited, or that
default is accompanied by some utility penalty. Here, I take advantage from the
introduction of cash by assuming that, even when the value of one’s collateral falls
below that of the promise, a borrower may still circumvent default by thanks to her
monetary endowment (or thanks to the money she inventoried from the previous
period, if any). This reduces the opportunity of default when compared to the
conventional, cashless modeling option of bankruptcy.
32See Giraud & Stahn (2003) for the impact of allowing for non-trivial monitoring in strategic
market games with incomplete security markets.
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c) Money plays here all its different roles: it can be hold for transactional pur-
poses (because of the liquidity constraints detailed supra) and as a store of value
between periods 0 and 1. But it can also be used as an asset that permits trans-
ferring wealth from one state to another in period 1, hence as an insurance tool: if
short-term interest rates are expected to be very high in some second-period state s,
then the economic agents will try to acquire money in advance in period 0. Further-
more, there may be also a speculative demand for money: inventorying money from
period 0 to period 1 is equivalent to holding an implicit (riskless, nominal) asset. If
the return of this asset becomes more attractive, a speculative demand for it will
appear. And finally, if commodity prices are expected to increase in the second
period, there will be a demand for money on the long-term loan market driven by
the fear for inflation.
It should be clear, however, that there is no money illusion: multiplying both and
inside money by some constant λ solely amounts to computing prices, say, in cents
rather than in euros). Since expectations are rational, the Central Bank’s policy is
also perfectly anticipated, so that the results to follow are not due to some irrational
anticipations. And nevertheless, we shall see that the “stylized facts” evoked in the
previous subsection can be recovered within the present setting.
4 General properties of monetary equilibria
Introducing collateral constraints in a model of incomplete markets has two well-
known consequences. The standard non-arbitrage argument that lies at the core
of pricing theory in the complete markets benchmark does no more hold, even at
equilibrium, in our set-up where markets are endogenously incomplete due to the
scarcity of collaterals. “Efficient financial markets” are usually said to be character-
ized by price processes that follow random walks. As is well-known, this martingale
property is satisfied in gei models (independently of the Pareto-inefficiency of its
equilibria, see, e.g., Geanakoplos (1990)), but need no more be satisfied in our set-
up with collateral requirements: when the collateral constraint is binding, its actual
price is the sum of two shadow prices, the marginal value attributed to it by its
marginal purchaser plus its value as a collateral (see, e.g., Cao (2010)). Hence, the
market incompleteness induced by the collateralization of assets is of specific nature
when compared to more classical models of market incompleteness. The second
consequence is that equilibrium pricing is no more linear. Hence, the celebrated
Modigliani-Miller theorem also fails in our setting as in any environment with non-
linear pricing rules (which has long been recognized, see Stiglitz (1974), Hellwig
(1981) or Geanakoplos (1990)).
4.1 The yield curve
It is easy to show that money, in our model, is non-neutral (see Dubey & Geanako-
plos (2003a,b)). Nevertheless, we get the analogue of a quantity theory of money:
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Proposition 4.1 At equilibrium, as soon as r0, r0 > 0, one has:
pik ·
∑
k,h
α˜hk + p0` ·
∑
`,h
q˜h0` =
∑
h
mh0 +M0 +M0. (25)
Similarly, if rs > 0, then
ps` ·
∑
`,h
q˜hs` =
∑
h
mhs +Ms. (26)
Proof. The local non-satiation of each trader’s preferences implies that, at
equilibrium, the two liquidity constraint (16) must be binding. Suppose the contrary:
Each individual h would gain by reducing (by a little) the right-hand side of each
inequality in order to increase her final allocation in consumption commodities in
state 0. A contradiction. Summing over h yields:
∑
h
[
µ˜h0 + µ˜
h
0 +
∑
k
α˜hk +
∑
`
q˜h0`
]
=
∑
h
mh0 +
1
1 + r0
∑
h
µh0 +
1
1 + r0
∑
h
µh0 .
The conclusion follows by (22), (23) and (24)— which must be binding at equilibrium
as well.

Notice that, at variance with Fisher’s seminal version of the quantity theory of money
(“Mv = pT”), here, the velocity of money is constant, and equal to 1, while prices
and the volume of transactions, T , are endogenous. This is why no “monetarist”
conclusion can be drawn from Prop. 4.1, while this version of the quantity theory
of money is compatible with the non-neutrality of money.
The next Proposition describes the term structure of interest rate, showing that
the full interplay of all the demands for money can be captured in our model (trans-
action, precaution, speculation, storage, insurance against inflation). Its proof easily
follows from Theorem 2 in Dubey & Geanakoplos (2003b). Details are left to the
reader.
Proposition 4.2 At any me,
(i) rs ≥ 0 ∀s ∈ S∗;
(ii) 1 + r0 ≥ mins∈S(1+r0)(1+rs) with strict inequality unless all rs are identical
∀s ∈ S ;
(iii) r0 ≤
∑
hm
h
0/M0 and rs ≤ µs(m,M) ∀s ∈ S ;
(iv) r0M0 + r0M0 + rsMs ≤
∑
h
(
mh0 + m
h
s
) ∀s ∈ S with an equality if, and only
if, there is no default in state s.
Let us briefly comment property (iv). On the left hand of the inequality, there
is the interest revenue of the Bank, and on the right, its expenditures (by way of,
say, gifts, lump sum transfers of the payment of past interests on the government’s
public debt, mhs , to households). This equation thus says that the government is
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balancing its budget on the long-run as long as there is no default, although Ms and
mhs may be quite arbitrary. On the other hand, whenever there are defaults in some
state s, the public deficit is given by:
Public deficit =
∑
h
(
mh0 +m
h
s )− r0M0 − r0M0 − rsMs.
This should make clear that a sovereign default is compatible with our market equi-
librium conditions as soon as investors may default on their collateralized derivatives.
This is true, in particular, in the third scenario to be described in section 5 below,
where all the private investors default in at least one second-period state.
4.2 Belief heterogeneity
The fourth property of monetary equilibria to be recorded in this section deals with
the issue of belief heterogeneity.33 We saw in the example of section 2 that it may
play a significant role in the emergence of rational exuberance at equilibrium. In
the complete markets case (where non collateral requirement is imposed and the
available assets span the whole space, RS, of returns in period 1), agents having
beliefs that are too far away from the “truth” are driven out of the market, as shown
by the next Proposition. Let us denote by P h ∈ ∆(S) the subjective probability
attributed by h on second-period states of nature. For the sake of simplifying the
discussion, we assume that each state, s ∈ S, belongs to the support of P h, for every
h. Let H be a measure of the belief heterogeneity among households, defined by:
H := ln max
h,i∈H,s∈S
P h(s)
P i(s)
.
Of course, if beliefs are perfectly homogeneous, H = 0. In the sequel, utiliy uh is
said to be separable whenever it is of the form:
uh(xh) = Uh0 (x
h
0) + λ
hEP
h[
Uh1 (x
h
1)
]
,
with a discount factor, λh ∈ (0, 1). Finally, the classical Inada condition reads:
U ′h1 (x
h
1)→ +∞ as xh1 → 0+.
Proposition 4.3 When markets are complete, if utilities are C1 and separable, with
Uh1 verifying Inada condition, then the consumption of at least one household gets
arbitrarily close to zero as the degree, H, of heterogeneity gets arbitrarily large.
Formally,
lim
H→+∞
xh1 = 0.
33For an early discussion of the common prior assumption, see Morris (1995).
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Proof. Suppose, to begin with, that all interest rates are 0. From the first-order
condition, at equilibrium, for any pair, h, i, of households, and any state s ∈ S,
U ′h1 (x
h
s )
U ′i1 (xis)
=
P i(s)U ′i0 (x
i
0)
P h(s)U ′h0 (x
h
0)
.
Since xis is bounded above by es :=
∑
t e
h
s and utilities are differentiably concave,
there exists some B > 0 such that: U ′i1 (x
i
s) ≤ B. Thus,
U ′h1 (x
h
s ) ≥
P i(s)U ′i0 (x
i
0)
P h(s)U ′h0 (x
h
0)
B.
As the degree of heterogeneity, H, increases to infinity, it must be the case that xhs
goes to zero.
Suppose, now, that interest rates are positive.
A COMPLETER.

By contrast, when markets are incomplete (because of collateral requirements),
then every consumer survives at equilibrium, even those who share arbitrarily wrong
beliefs. The proposition below shows, indeed, that, even with arbitrarily large differ-
ence in beliefs, no household’s consumption will come arbitrarily close to 0 at some
state. Therefore, incomplete markets differ from complete markets when consumers
differ in their beliefs. The intuition for this result is the same as in Cao (2010) :
if an agent believes that the likelihood of a state is much smaller than what other
agents believe, the consumer will want to exchange her consumption in that state
for consumption in other states. Complete markets allow her to do so but, in in-
complete markets, collateral constraint limits the amount of consumption that she
can sell in each state.
Proposition 4.4 Suppose that, for every h, uh is separable and limxh0→0+ U
h
0 (x
h
0) =
limxhs→0+ U
h
s (x
h
s ) = −∞,34 then, at a monetary equilibrium with collateral, every
trader’s consumption is bounded below in each state s ∈ S∗ by some constant, c > 0.
Proof. In period 0, refusing to trade and consuming only one’s initial endowment, eh0
is always a feasible strategy. In period 1, refusing to honor all one’s debt, providing
one’s creditor with the stored collateral, and consuming only one’s initial endowment
is also a feasible strategy (because of the postulated limited liability of consumers),
even when a state of nature is chosen to which she attributed an arbitrarily small
occurrence probability. Hence, for every h, one has, at equilibrium:
uh(xh) ≥ uh(eh).
34Log-linear utility or CRRA utility with CRRA constant exceeding 1 clearly verify this assump-
tion.
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Since consumption in every state s ∈ S is bounded from above by the total endow-
ment of commodities, there exists some B > 0 such that Uhs (x
h
s ) ≤ B. Hence,
Uh0 (x
h
0) ≥ Uh0 (eh0) + λ(Uhs (ehs )−B) > Uh0 (c) ∀s ∈ S,
for some c > 0 small enough. The same argument can be repeated for h’s consump-
tion in every state s ∈ S of the second period. Hence the result. 
Corollary 4.1 Under the hypotheses of Propositions (4.3) and (4.4), there is a
degree of belief heterogeneity, H, above which no monetary equilibrium with collateral
is Pareto-optimal.
Proof. In an incomplete markets set-up with collateral, each consumer’s consump-
tion is bounded away from 0 (Proposition (4.4)). In the complete market setting,
the consumption of at least one consumer goes to 0 when H → +∞ (Proposition
(4.3)). This holds, whatever being initial endowments. Thus, for any choice of initial
endowments, the two sets of equilibria no more intersect for H sufficiently high. The
second welfare theorem then implies that no monetary equilibrium with collateral
requirements can be Pareto-optimal. 
Notice that the preceding corollary holds for any monetary policy. Thus, even
if interest rates were 0, the resulting equilibrium would be Pareto-suboptimal. The
suboptimality, here, is not primarily due to the friction induced by a positive interest
rate but to the survival of players with heterogenous beliefs, which itself is clearly
due to the collateral requirements.
4.3 Gains to trade
In this section, we introduce the intratemporal gains-to-trade assumption borrowed
from Dubey & Geanakoplos (2003b).
Let xh ∈ RS∗×L+ be any feasible allocation for household h. For any γ ≥ 0, we
say that x = (xh)h ∈
(
RS∗×L+
)H
is not γ-Pareto optimal in state s if there exist some
trades (τhs )h ∈
(
RL)H in state s ∈ S∗, such that∑
h
τhs = 0 (feasibility) (27)
xhs + τ
h
s ∈ RL+ for all h ∈ H (consumability) (28)
uh(xh[γ, τhs ]) ≥ uh(xh) ∀h ∈ H, with at least one strict inequality (improvement)
(29)
where, for every ` ∈ L,
x[γ, τh]t` :=
{
xht` if t ∈ S∗ \ {s}
xhs` + min{τhs`, τ
h
s`
1+γ
} for t = s.
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In words, the trades, τh, considered as candidates to γ-Pareto-improve xh involve
a tax of γ/(1 + γ) on trade. Of course, 0-Pareto-optimality coincides with the
standard notion of Pareto-optimality. The gains to trade, γs(x), in state s at a point
x ∈ (RS∗×L+ )H is defined as the supremum of all γ for which x is not γ-Pareto-optimal
in state s.
When entering state s ∈ S in period 1, the stock of outside money (owned by
the households free and clear of any offsetting obligations) is equal to the money
inventoried from period 0 less what is already owed on the long loan to the Bank.
As in Dubey & Geanakoplos (2003b), it is easy to show that this stock is never more
than
mˆhs :=
∑
h
mh0 −min
t∈S
∑
hm
h
0
M0 +Mt
M0,
where the stock of inside money injected in state s is Ms. The maximal ratio of
outside to inside money in state s ∈ S is therefore given by: mˆs/Ms.
The gains-to-trade hypothesis can now be formulated as follows. For every state
s ∈ S, let us denote by Xs the subset of feasible and consumable trades (τh)h that
involve no trade in state s.
Gains-to-trade hypothesis. For all s ∈ S and every x ∈ Xs, γs(x) >
mˆs
Ms
.
This assumption requires that there be gains to trade in every state s ∈ S in
period 1, but not necessarily in period 0. It also rules out the case of only one
commodity per state, because then, any feasible and consumable allocation would
be automatically 0-Pareto optimal. Similarly, it rules out the representative agent
case where H = 1, because, again, this would lead to Pareto-optimality for free.
If initial endowments in the economy E are not Pareto-optimal, then as Ms →
+∞ leaving the economy otherwise fixed, the Gains-to-trade hypothesis will sooner
or later be satisfied.
4.4 Existence
The next result (whose proof is in the Appendix) extends the existence theorem of
Dubey & Geanakoplos (2003b) to the case where households can default on the de-
livery of collateralized derivatives. The main upshot is that, here, equilibrium asset
prices may be zero. By contrast, as soon as households are endowed with a positive
amount of costless outside money, no commodity price can reach 0. Similarly, even
when individual monetary endowments vanish, if only firms are allowed to default,
their positive endowment in commodities ensures that equilibrium prices will always
be positive.
Theorem 4.1 Any monetary economy E verifying our standing assumptions to-
gether with the gains-to-trade hypothesis has a me.
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For the reader familiar with the incomplete markets literature with collateral or
with money, this existence result should not be too surprising. Indeed, I allow for
real assets, options, derivatives, and even more complicated non-linear assets. In
the standard framework with no money and no collateral constraints, the presence
of such assets implies that the space of feasible income transfers does not depend
continuously on commodity prices, so that equilibrium may not exist.35 In the
present framework however, there are two forces which help restoring existence: both
the collateral requirements and the cash-in-advance constraints place an endogenous
bound on short-sales. The first one because of the scarcity of collateralized assets
(see, e.g., Geanakoplos & Zame (2002)), the second, because of the scarcity of money
(cf. e.g., Dubey & Geanakoplos 2003b)). As in the standard incomplete markets
setup (see Radner (1972) for instance), a lower-bound on short-sales eliminates the
discontinuity and guarantees existence.
It should be stressed that no Gains-to-trade hypothesis is needed in period 0 in
order to guarantee the existence of an active monetary equilibrium. Nevertheless,
it should be clear that the Pareto-optimality of any period 0 equilibrium allocation
depends upon r0 and r0. The smaller are these interest rates, the closer will be the
allocation to optimality. As a consequence, monetary authorities may be willing to
increase M0 and M0 in order to improve the optimality of trades. The next section
is devoted to the implications of such a monetary policy.
5 Robust liquidity trap versus financial crash
We now show the central result of this paper, namely that monetary authorities face
a universal dilemma. Quite robustly, the monetary authority will be able to improve
the efficiency of trade, and thus total real output, by increasing supplies of Bank
money or, equivalently, by lowering interest rates.36 This will have the additional
side cost of increasing price levels because of the quantity theory of money, as shown
by the next lemma:
Lemma 5.1 If M0 +M0 → +∞, then ||pi, p0|| → +∞.
Proof.
Recall, indeed, that transactions are uniformly bounded, either because of the
physical constraints on commodities or because of the collateral requirements on
derivatives (12).
35SeeDuffie & Shafer (1985) for a generic existence proof, Ku & Polemarchakis (1996) for a
robust example of non-existence with options.
36It should be clear, indeed, that in this model, the Bank’s monetary policy can be equivalently
understood as consisting in choosingM0,M0 and letting r0, r0 clear the loans markets or in choosing
r0, r0 and adjusting M0,M0 in order to balance the demand for money. Thus, our approach is
compatible both with the traditional inflationary target a` la Taylor and with the quantitative
targets to which some Central Banks seem to have gone back after the 2008 crisis (and which was
never entirely abandoned by the ECB.
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
Thus an expansionary monetary policy will reduce the real wealth of those who
begin with high initial stocks of money, mhs > 0 (for s ∈ S∗). It turns out, however,
that the monetary authority will be stymied in its efforts to increase output and
the price levels by increasing M0: Either this leads the economy to a liquidity
trap (in the Keynesian meaning of this word) or to a large bubble on the financial
markets, whose burst induces the general collapse of the whole economy in at least
one second-period state.
Theorem 5.1 Under the assumptions of Theorem 4.1,
(i) Fix E \ M0: There is a level of money M∗0 and commodity price levels p∗0
such that, for every monetary economy E = 〈M0, E \M0〉 with M0 ≥ M∗0 and every
monetary equilibrium, (η, (σh)t) for E, one of the three following situations arises:
(ii a)Either r0 = 0, p0 ≤ p∗0 and households horde at least M0 −M∗0 as
unspent money balances in period 0 —this is the “liquidity trap”.
(ii) Else, for every state s in period 1, one of the two cases occurs:
(ii b) Either ∀ε > 0, there exists M∗0 > 0 such that, for every
M0 ≥M∗0 , rs ≤ ε in every state s.
(ii c) Or some agents default in state s and no-trade prevails.
Proof. In equilibrium, the following holds:
r0M0 + r0M0 + rsMs ≥
∑
h
(mh0 +m
h
s ) for all s ∈ S,
with equality if there is no bankruptcy. The reason is that no agent will hold
worthless money at the end of any state in period 1. Thus, all the money, M0 +
M0 + Ms +
∑
h(m
h
0 + m
h
s ) is used to repay either the principal, M0 + M0 + Ms or
the interest payments, r0M0 + r0M0 + rsMs.
We begin with (M,m) and a monetary equilibrium. Assume that r0 > 0. Sup-
pose the monetary authority increases M0 or, equivalently, lower the current short-
term interest rate, r0.
We know from Theorem 4.1 that a monetary equilibrium exists whatever being
the Bank’s monetary policy. Since we are in a REE world, prices and monetary
policy in period 1, in each state s ∈ S, are perfectly anticipated ex ante. Hence,
there is a finite amount of money, Ms, injected at time 1, in state s, and agents
know it. Thus, the total stock of money available to be spent in state s is no more
than M0 +Ms +m0 +ms.
Suppose, to begin with, that the volume,
∑
h z
h−
s , of aggregate equilibrium supply
of spot commodities in each state s is bounded from below, and that this lower-bound
is independent from M0. This means that spot prices, ps, at time 1, must have an
upper-bound independent from M0, as follows from qtm:
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ps ·
∑
h
zh−s = ps ·
∑
h
zh+s ≤M0 +Ms +m0 +ms.
Let denote p = maxs∈S,`=1,...,L ps`. This implies that commodity and asset prices at
time 0 must be bounded by some constant, say, K, independent of M0. Otherwise,
indeed, every one could sell ε > 0 of any item (be it a commodity or a security) she
is positively endowed (either directly or as a collateral) with at time 0, and buy the
whole economy in some state in period 1 for a price at most equal to max(p, ..., p) ·z,
where z is any allocation belonging to the (compact) feasible set. If r0 > 0 and the
monetary equilibrium is active, then M0 must be borrowed and spent in time 0
: no agent would borrow money at positive interest unless she is going to spend
it. But payments on assets and derivatives are all bounded above by the stock of
money available in state s, the payments of any one of these securities is bounded
above, independently of M0. Hence, there is an upper-bound, independent of M0,
on how much money is spent on securities in period 0. The rest must be spent on
consumption goods. Because no more than
∑
h e
h
0 can be put up for sale, prices
p0 must become arbitrarily large as M0 increases because of qtm. This contradicts
the boundedness of period 0 prices. Hence, as M0 rises, eventually, r0 = 0, and the
hoarding of real money balances thereafter increases proportionately with M0−M∗0 .
The economy has therefore reached a liquidity trap when M0 ≥ M∗0 : even if the
Bank pumps in more and more money, this has no real effect any more. This is case
(iia) of the Theorem. It occurs essentially because people have rational expectations,
and expect money at time 1 to be bounded across states, independently of M0.
Next, if the economy does not fall into a global trap at time 0, this means that, at
time 1, either the quantity of available money increases with M0 or that the size of
aggregate supply,
∑
h z
h−
s , shrinks to zero. The first case means that second period
interest rates, rs → 0+ as M0 → +∞. This is case (ii b) in the Theorem.
Suppose that, in state s, rs is bounded below independently of M0. How can
lim
M0→+∞
∑
h
zhs = 0
happen at equilibrium ? This is where default really enters the picture. We have
supposed, indeed, that, in each state s ∈ S, there are positive gains to trade in
spot commodities, and that there is enough inside money, so that the gains-to-
trade hypothesis is fulfilled.Therefore, the unique reason why households would not
trade in state s is because some assets defaulted so that sufficiently many agents
have already lost their wealth when entering in state s. Prima facie, this seems
impossible because the collateral ensures that nobody can lose its whole wealth due
to default: everyone gets at least the collateral of the assets she bought in period 0.
This is where the possible forfeiture of cash plays its role, as shown in the Example
of section 2: default may prevent from trading because a significant number of
agents have no cash to finance their purchases or to borrow money on the short-loan
market. 
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The strength of Theorem (5.1) is to show that there is actually no escape road
from what we have called the monetary dilemma : Either the Central Bank commits
to fostering inflation, or it takes the risk of either a liquidity trap or a financial crash.
The weakness of this general theorem is that it does not prove that each of these
three regimes may actually take place. This is why it needs to be supplemented by
the Example of section 2.
6 Some comments in light of the 2007-09 crisis
This paper does not attempt to provide a unified analysis of the global crisis that
started in 2007. Nevertheless, the model presented above, and its main results, shed
some light about what we may have learned from the crisis and the policy issues
raised by the response of the authorities to it. The monetary dilemma highlighted
by Theorem (5.1) says that there are 3, and only 3, scenarios compatible with the
Nash equilibrium conditions:
- scenario 1: No liquidity trap and no default in the second period, but the size
of injected money, (M0, (Ms)s) allows to improve the efficiency of trades at the cost
of a possibly unbounded inflation of commodity and asset prices in both periods.
- scenario 2: Inflation is prevented in the second period but at the cost of a
liquidity trap in the first one.
- scenario 3: rational exuberance on financial markets leads to a global crash in
the second period.
The introduction of collateral requirements into monetary general equiliibrium
analysis enables to emphasize the role of leveraging as one of the microeconomic
roots of financial crashes. Indeed, as shown by section 2 above, the larger the
leverage ratio, the larger are the debts of optimistic investors in case of default. It
has been argued, e.g., by Adrian & Shin (2008) that, even in the absence of a true
bankruptcy, the very fact that a bank’s assets have lost value implies a sudden rise
in the leverage ratio, which is likely to lead the bank to sell off assets or restrict
credit in order to deleverage. This, however, is a partial equilibrium argument.
Here, we can recast the argument within a general equilibrium framework: it is the
shift of wealth between optimistic investors and pessimistic ones that can create
a dramatic fall in prices and, eventually, a crash (see Geanakoplos (2001)) for the
seminal statement of this phenomenon).37
This is not to say that our story depicts financial crashes as “black swans”, i.e.,
as large-impact, low-probability events against which any protection would be ex-
ceedingly costly.38 According to our model, there are two ways to circumvent the
risk of a big crash. The first one consists in turning to a contractionnary mone-
tary policy —at the cost of running the risk of falling into the liquidity trap (i.e.,
of shifting from scenario 3 to scenario 2). The second way consists in regulating
37Large European banks in 2007 had leverage ratios between 20 in the UK and 35 in Switzerland
(see Panetta & Angelini (2009)).
38For a defense of the “Black Swan” viewpoint, see Blanckfein (2009).
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financial markets so as to reduce their leverage ratio (driven by β in the Example of
section 2) —at the cost of having to accept a high inflation rate on consumer prices
whenever the monetary policy remains expansionary.
On the other hand, the interplay between money and collaterals enables to show
how the macroeconomic environment may contribute to the excessive leveraging
and risk-taking. US and global monetary instances have been criticized as exces-
sively expansionary (Taylor (2008)). According to this view, monetary policy in the
aftermath of the 2001 recession remained too lax for too long and this triggered
asset-price inflation, primarily but not exclusively on the US housing market, and a
generalized leverage boom. Had it followed the Taylor rule, so goes the argument,
the Fed would have tightened rates faster, instead of lowering interest rates further
to counter perceived deflation risks. Accordingly, short-term rates would have been
higher between 2001 and 2005, making the subsequent burst less pronounced. This
paper recasts this debate within a general equilibrium set-up with rational expecta-
tions: it is indeed the quantity M0 of money injected on the short-term loans market
that may fuel an inflation of asset prices (“rational exuberance”) when leverage on
the financial markets is sufficiently large. This means that one explanation of the
Great Moderation (and of the fact that consumer price inflation remained rather
subdued throughout the 2000-06 period) might rest on the sharp increase of lever-
age ratios on financial markets. Despite the vivid growth of the world monetary
base (15% each year since 1997, 30% since 2007) we did not observe the domestic
inflation we should have experienced according to the Quantity Theory of Money
(equation (??)) because this huge amount of fresh liquidity migrated from the real
sector to the financial sphere.
On the other hand, however, Theorem 2 shows that the deflation risk is perfectly
compatible with rational expectations and market clearing. Thus, when then-board
member Ben Bernanke famously outlined a contingency plan to avoid the repeti-
tion of the Japanese experience (Bernanke (2002)), he was not referring to some
improbable curiosity: the liquidity trap is part of an equilibrium story with rational
expectations. Moreover, our dilemma shows that, whenever a central bank efficiently
accomplishes its mission dedicated to consumer-price stability (i.e., avoids scenario
1), then it faces only two alternative scenarios: Either inflation on financial markets
driven by some “rational exuberance” whose burst may induce a global collapse (sce-
nario 3) or a liquidity trap (scenario 2). In scenario 3, if the central Bank sticks to
consumer-price stability it will have little reason to raise interest rates aggressively,
and will therefore be unable to fight against rational exuberance, hence, to prevent
a crash. Thus, our approach provides a theoretical ground for a plea in favor of
Central Banks standing ready to depart from their price stability goal in the name
of financial stability.
In scenario 2, application of the Taylor benchmark encounters the zero-bound
problem: While the Taylor rule would recommend a negative interest rate, this is
impossible to achieve because rational depositors are not prepared to pay for keeping
deposits. Thus, our approach also makes the case for unconventional monetary
policies in order to avoid liquidity traps. The recommended policy, however, cannot
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be the zero-interest rate policy (ZIRP), at least in our model. Imagine, indeed, that
the central Bank prints vast amounts of banknotes and drops them from helicopters.
Individuals receiving banknotes from heaven could feel suddenly richer and could
spend at least of this money, especially if they have hear about monetarism and fear
that relying on the printing press will in the end induce inflation. Demand should
pick up and inflation would indeed follow later on. This conventional reasoning,
however, does not hold here: the quantity theory of money, in the present model,
is not monetarist in essence, nor are rational economic agents. Thus, they know
that the Central Bank’s power to create money does not automatically result in
inflation. If, on the contrary, people are convinced that, in the second period, the
Central Bank won’t pursue its easing policy, the scenario 2 of my narrative tells
us that they will horde the helicopter money unspent. For this additional money
to help the economy escape from the liquidity trap, the Bank must convince the
economic agents that it will go further in its zero-interest rate policy, hence should
commit to put zero interest rates in the second period as well: we are then back to
our scenario 1.
The issue at hand therefore becomes to find channels by which the central Bank
can commit, implicitly or explicitly, to higher inflation in the future (i.e., to even
lower rates and more liquidity in the second period). As was said by Krugman,
it amounts to “committing to be irresponsible”. Such a commitment allows to
shift from scenario 3 to scenario 1. How can the central Bank proceed to such
a commitment ? For instance, by monitoring long-term rates, r0. Central Banks
normally only target the short end of the yield curve, leaving the determination of
longer-term interest rates to market mechanisms. In a situation of near-deflation,
however, the central Bank can commit to keep policy rates low for an extended
period and inter into refinancing operations with extend maturity, thereby imposing
a ceiling on interest rates at the corresponding horizon. Here, there is room for a
monitoring of long-term rates: if r0 decreases (say, by the increase of M0), then the
no-arbitrage relation between first-period long-term rates and second-period short-
term rates implies that rs must decrease for each s.
Thus, our approach sustains the viewpoint vividly expressed by Krugman (1998a,
2000) (and later by Orphanides (2004)) in the context of the Japanese crisis: the
Central Bank of Japan “needs a credible commitment to expand not only the current
but also future money supplies, which therefore raises future expected prices —or,
equivalently, a credible commitment to future inflation” (Krugman (2000)). Theo-
rem 2 shows that, there is no alternative to such an “irresponsible”” commitment, as
otherwise the central Bank faces two major failures —either the deflationary liquid-
ity trap or the possibility of a financial crash. This absence of fourth scenario (where
the central Bank could avoid any disaster and still commit to be “responsible”’ with
respect to consumer prices) is what I have called the “dilemma of monetary policy”.
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7 Appendix
This Appendix provides the proof of the existence theorem (4.1). We prepare the
proof with a lemma.
Lemma 7.1 Let p be an eme price vector of
(E(e), (µi),M). There exists η > 0
such that p` > η for every commodity `.
Proof of Lemma 7.1
Let K >
∑
h
∑
` e
i
`. Define u
∗
i := maxτ∈[0,1] u
τ
i (K, ...,K), fix some τ ∈ [0, 1], and
let Hτ > 0 be chosen large enough so that
uτi (0, ..., 0, H
τ , 0, ..., 0) > u∗i ,
for Hτ in any component. The following argument (adapted from footnote 19 in
Dubey & Geanakoplos (2003a)) proves that such an Hτ exists. Let  be the cube
with sides of length K in RL+. Define u˜τi : RL+ → R by u˜τi (y) := inf{Lx(y), x ∈ u, Lx
is an affine function representing the supporting hyperplane to the graph of uτi at
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the point (x, uτi (x))}. u˜τi coincides with uτi on , and there exists some Hτ such
that u˜τi (0, ..., 0, H
τ , 0, ..., 0) > u∗i for H
τ in any component.
Now, if µ∗ := maxi µi and H := maxτ∈[0,1] Hτ , we claim that
pτ` ≥
µ∗
H
.
Otherwise, any agent i with µi = µ
∗ could spend her money in order to buy H units
of commodity `, thus obtaining a final utility u˜τi (0, ..., 0, H, 0, ...0) higher than u
∗
i . A
contradiction.

Proof of Theorem 4.1 The main difficulty lies in the fact that financial asset
prices may be zero.39 As in Geanakoplos & Zame (2003), I first construct, for each
pi > 0, an auxiliary economy, Epi, which differs from E only in that asset promises
are given by:
Apisk(η0, η1) := Ask(η0, η1) + pi.
In these economies, I prove existence of an active monetary equilibrium with deriva-
tive prices that are bounded away from 0. I then construct an equilibrium for E by
taking the limit as pi → 0+.
Step 1. Existence in Epi with a dummy player.
For any ε > 0, we define a truncated generalized game Γεpi on a continuum player-
set with types H. Each time h corresponds to, say, the unit interval [0, 1] of identical
players, equipped with the restriction of the Lebesgue measure. Following Dubey &
Geanakoplos (2003a, 2006a,b), we add a dummy player who puts up for sale ε units
for sale of each instrument (commodities, assets, loans) except for derivatives, fo
which s/he puts only ε2. Furthermore, s/he puts up ε units of money for purchase
on every market. This external player fully delivers on her/his promises. However,
on her/his ε2 sale of derivatives, s/he delivers only up to a cap of ε dollars, actually
delivering the minimum between ε and what s/he owes.
The other players act strategically, and prices form so as to clear every market
(taking the dummy player into account). A type-symmetric Nash equilibrium (NE)
of Γε will be called an ε-Monetary Equilibrium (ε-ME).40
I first construct truncated strategy sets in the auxiliary game Γεpi. By assumption,
collateral requirements for each asset are non zero. Choose a constant M so large
that, for each s, k, Mκs,k ≥ e :=
∑
h eh. Thus, to sell M units of asset A
pi
sk would
require more collateral than is available in the entire economy.
39Given our rational expectations set-up, the price of any asset yielding a 0 return will necessarily
be 0 at equilibrium. For instance, a call to purchase an ounce of gold at C 800 will be priced 0 if,
at equilibrium, the price of gold is always strictly less than C 800.
40Throughout the proof, we confine ourselves to type-symmetric action profiles. By a slight
abuse of notations, the action, σh, of type h will denote either the aggregate action,
∫
[0,1]
στdλ(d),
or the action of a single, negligible, individual τ ∈ [0, 1]. The interpretation should be clear from
the context.
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For any ε > 0, define Σhε := {σh : 0 ≤ σh ≤ 1/ε}, the ambient strategy space
of type h where derivatives purchases and sales are bounded:
∀h, 0 ≤ αhk ≤ NM and α˜hk ≤ NM.
Given an action profile σ = (σh)t ∈
∏
t∈T Σ
h
ε , define the macrovariables η(σ) :=
(r, pi, p), recursively as follows:
1
1 + rn
:=
ε+Mn +
∑
h∈H µ˜
h
n
ε+
∑
h µ
h
n
(nth loan market )
pik :=
ε+
∑
h∈H α˜
h
k
ε+
∑
h∈H α
h
k
(kth derivative)
ps` :=
ε+
∑
h q˜
h
s`
ε+
∑
h q
h
s`
(commodity s`)
Furthermore, define:
Aε,σsk (η˜0, η˜s) :=
( ε2
ε2 +
∑
h α
h
k
)
min
{
Ask(η˜0; η˜s),
1
ε
}
+
( ∑
h α
h
k
ε2 +
∑
h α
h
k
)
Ask(η˜0, η˜s),
which is the effective delivery of a derivative k in state s. The payoff to any player
h is:
Πh(σ, σh) :=
{
uh
(
(ehs` − qhs` + q˜
h
s`
ps`
)
s`∈S∗×L
)
if t := h ∈ H
uj(ηε(σ), σ
j) if t := j ∈ J
Finally, the subset of Σhε that is feasible for player h, given σ, is Σ
h
ε∩Σˆhηε(σ), where
Σˆhηε(σ) is defined in the same way as Σ
h
ηε(σ)
, but replacing Ask(η˜0, η˜s) with A
ε,σ
sk (η˜0, η˜s)
because of the specific behavior of the dummy player.
This completes the construction of the generalized market game Γε. Since players
can bid and supply on each side of each market, it can be interpreted as a double
auction where only market orders are allowed (and not limit-price orders). Because,
thanks to the introduction of the dummy player, all the standard convexity and
continuity assumptions are satisfied, best-reply correspondences have a closed graph
and convex values. They also have non-empty values at every price because asset
purchases and sales are bounded (by M). This bounds the potential arbitrages that
may occur when the sale of an asset enables to finance an additional loan of money
and the purchase of its collateral requirement.
Thus, the standard Kakutani-fixed-point argument ensures that there exists a
type-symmetric pure NE in the truncated generalized game ΓpiM,ε.
Step 2. pi → 0+.
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Let (p...) be a monetary equilibrium of Epi and let pi → 0+. By construction,
prices, consumption plans lie in a bounded set, so that we can choose a convergence
subsequence. Let the limit prices be (p∗, pi∗). I claim that the player’s best-reply
correspondence verifies the standard boundary condition shared in GET by the
aggregate excess demand set-valued map:
||BR(p)|| → ∞ if p→ ∂RL.
The proof of the claim follows closely the proof of Theorem 1 in Zame & Geanakoplos
(2002). The unique difference lies in the cash-in-advance constraints which provide
an upper-bound on the excess demand due to the scarcity of money. But, as prices
shrink to zero, the purchasing power of money becomes infinite and the cash-in-
advance constraints loose any bite. Details are omitted.
Commodity prices, p∗ do not lie on the boundary ∂RL+, for otherwise the best-
reply map at prices (p∗, pi∗) would be unbounded rather than zero. Therefore, the
consumption plans are utility optimal in consumers’ (truncated) budget set at prices
(p∗, pi∗). Being the limit of feasible plans, they are feasible. Hence, the artificial
bounds on asset purchases and sales are not binding at the prices (p∗, pi∗). Hence
the limit associated with (p∗, pi∗) constitutes a full-blown monetary equilibrium of
Eε.
Step 3. Dropping the dummy player.
It remains to show that a limit of ε-ME, as ε → 0+ is a bona fide ME of E .
The main steps of the proof are identical to that of Dubey & Geanakoplos (2003a,
2006b) and are not repeated here. This time, the variance with the papers just cited
is that, here, we must take into account the durability of collaterals, the storability of
commodities and the specific definition of an asset’s return. But this does not impair
the argument, which can be roughly summarized as follows. As ε → 0+, if prices
remain bounded, then, up to a subsequence, the limit must be a ME of E . Else,
some prices diverge to infinity as ε→ 0+, but then, the purchasing power of outside
money goes to zero. This implies that the limit must be a no-trade equilibrium,
which contradicts the gains-to-trade hypothesis. Details are left to the reader.

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